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Abstract
Aim and purposes: This study conducts an across-the-board comparative analysis of the impact of the main
measures used by the 10 leading maritime nations of the EU on the relative competitiveness of the fleets that they
control, covering the period from 1996 to 2011. We propose two models to compare the relative effectiveness of
the maritime policy measures implemented: one for the full set of countries and measures and the other
specifically for each maritime nation.
Findings: The estimation results make us conclude that generally the measures adopted in national-level maritime
policies (tonnage tax, second register and other measures) seem to have been effective in that they have had a
positive effect on the competitiveness of controlled fleets, but with uneven impact on the fleets of each country.
Keywords: Relative effectiveness of the maritime policy measures, European Union, Competitiveness of controlled
fleets, Protectionism and state aid
1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), maritime transport, despite
taking a relatively small proportion of gross domestic
product (1%), represents more than 640,000 direct jobs
and 40% of global gross tonnage ([4], p. 6). At European
level, nearly 75% of the Union’s external trade and 37%
of the internal is conducted by sea [24].
Like other areas of production, the maritime industry
has had to endure competition from emerging countries
in the past few decades, including competition from a
number of jurisdictions with more relaxed standards of
fleet operating requirements (the so-called “flags of con-
venience” –FOCs1- or “open registries”). The relative fleet
capacity of such countries has increased in detriment to
traditional seafaring countries, including numerous EU
Member States. In 1970 the world’s fleet was distributed
as follows in terms of cargo capacity (Dead Weight Ton-
nage or DWT): 65% was owned by developed countries,
6% by developing countries and 22% by open registry
countries. In 2015 the figures were 16%, 27% and 56% re-
spectively (UNCTAD [41], p.42).
It must be taken into account on the one hand that
FOC countries (Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands,
Malta, the Bahamas, Cyprus, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines and Antigua and Barbuda) offer certain ad-
vantages: i) easier registration; ii) the ability to use
cheaper foreign labour; and iii) lower safety require-
ments. Moreover, foreign owners do not usually pay in-
come tax in these countries.
On the other hand, fleet development in new, emer-
ging maritime nations (Hong Kong, Singapore, China,
Korea, Indonesia, India, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia) has
been associated mainly with four factors: i) development
of a trade policy oriented towards foreign trade which
generates the availability of cargo required to set up
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their own fleets; ii) investment in infrastructures that
make effective, competitive maritime transport possible;
iii) accumulation of the capital needed to invest in ships;
and iv) in some cases the availability of cheaper labour.
The development of large fleets in these recently
industrialised countries (closely linked to the type of
trade in which they engage) has changed the traditional
make up of the global fleet, in terms not just of owner-
ship but also of specialisation in certain types of vessel.
The importance of these changes lies in the fact that
the competitive pressures exerted by both types of coun-
try in certain fleet segments has reduced or entirely
eliminated the market presence of European operators.2
As a result, development of the European fleet in the
past 30 years has taken place under a framework of pro-
tectionist policies. In almost all EU countries a number
of state support instruments have been used to develop,
or at least protect, national fleets based on arguments
such as promoting the training and employment of sea-
farers or providing support for a maritime cluster.
Moreover, the exceptional nature of Community links
to the beneficiaries of state aid introduces the concept of
“controlled fleet” that includes both the fleet sailing
under the flag of the country of reference (national flag)
and vessels sailing under other flags which are owned by
national companies (foreign flag). Thus, there are there-
fore two possibilities to define the relevant variable: the
capacity of the controlled fleet or that of the national
flagged fleet. In this paper we propose to use as variable
of interest the controlled fleet (sailing under national or
foreign flags).
This study conducts an across-the-board comparative
analysis of the impact of the main measures used by the
leading maritime nations of the EU on the relative com-
petitiveness of the fleets that they control, covering the
period from 1996 to 2011. The paper is organised as fol-
lows: Section 2 reviews the changes over time in Com-
munity policy on maritime transport; Section 3 identifies
the main measures implemented by Member States
under that policy; Section 4 selects a variable and a com-
petitiveness indicator with which to estimate the impact
of the measures taken; Section 5 draws up the models
and outlines the results of the estimation; and the final
section presents conclusions.
2 Changes over time in maritime transport
policies in the EU
Policies in support of maritime transport have tradition-
ally been justified with the argument that “trade follows
the flag” [3]. In the case of the EU the specific factors
favouring protectionism in the sector are the following:
– the recession in the global economy following the
first oil crisis in 1973, which reduced demand for
transport and thus created significant overcapacity
in the world’s maritime transport market;
– potential competition from new maritime nations
which used protectionist policies to develop their
own fleets;
– FOCs which offered a more competitive
environment than European registries.
The loss of competitiveness among fleets from trad-
itional maritime nations resulted in a major reduction in
capacity in European fleets due to re-flagging under
international registries (flags of convenience) and a net
loss of tonnage (scrapping, sale, etc). This spurred Euro-
pean governments into setting up unilateral support
measures such as direct and indirect subsidies and dis-
criminatory practices, resulting in a wide range of differ-
ent measures which distorted competition between the
national registries of EU Member States.
However, it can be argued that Community develop-
ments on matters of maritime transport policy came too
late. As ([31], p. 187) argue, “For many years, the Euro-
pean Community (EC) (later the European Union) did
not have a shipping policy”. Until 1985 there were no
commitments on this matter, and those that came later
were conditioned mainly by the decline in Community
fleets and the pressure exerted by newly joined Member
States with significant maritime interests (e.g. Greece in
1981). These two factors resulted in the issuing of the
Communication Progress towards a Common Transport
Policy. Maritime Transport [17], the main goal of which
was to tackle the problems of competitiveness in the sec-
tor and apply the basic principles of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community to maritime
transport (Regulations 4055/86, 4057/86, 4058/86).
In the words of Roe [35], p.3: “Regulation 4056/86 was
inconsistent, incoherent, and irrational in the context of
the Treaty of Rome, the principles of the EU and their
relatively rigid application to all other sectors. For 20
years, simply its existence was a clear policy failure as it
violated the most significant principle that drives the EU
in all that it does—that of free competition to achieve
maximum economic benefits across the EU”. In 1989 a
framework was set up to bring together the measures
applied by Member States [16]. These measures were re-
vised and redefined in 1997 [14] and maintained in 2004
[13]. They were only finally eliminated in 2008 despite
almost universal condemnation apart from a few ship-
owners that were the major beneficiaries from the pro-
tection offered.
2According to the UNCTAD [40], China’s development of an oil-
tanker fleet from 2006 to 2011 to carry a larger percentage of the
country’s oil imports under its own flag resulted in a 16% drop in the
market share of European shipowners on the route between the
Middle-East and China.
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Thus Paixao and Marlow [32], p. 364 think that the
market players appear to focus constantly on numerous
issues already addressed in several EU communications
on transport and short sea shipping which have proven
not to provide a solution. Some protectionist practices
in this sector have gradually been eliminated within the
EU, but the resulting policy can still not be described as
fully liberal. State aid is still provided for maritime trans-
port, and Regulations such as n° 3577/92 (free provision
of maritime cabotage services) do not open up cabotage
traffic to all nationalities but limit it to vessels registered
in the EU.3
As stated by Bredima and Tzoannos [6], one important
aspect of the development of Community maritime pol-
icy is that it was founded on the basis of the different in-
terests of governments and powerful groups in Member
States, and was thus focused on their own national in-
dustries. As a result the legislation produced did not
take a harmonic approach to some aspects, such as trad-
ing conditions, technical requirements for vessels, crew
requirements or the taxation of shipping companies.
Member States took unilateral measures which in some
cases distorted competition in the internal market.
A similar situation can be seen today: although there
is a framework of development for state aid to the mari-
time transport sector which sets upper limits on the aid
available to EU Member States, the various national leg-
islations have the power to set the size of those limits
and regulate their application to different types of traffic.
Moreover, divergences can be seen in other aspects such
as crew requirements (minimum crew rosters and na-
tionality of seafarers). These two aspects seem to distort
competitiveness between European registries and cause
fleet transfers from one Member State to another (espe-
cially in cabotage).
The widespread use of FOCs as a way of increasing
the competitiveness of the fleets of developed countries
(though it is currently also spreading to developing
countries such as China) has become a problem for
European governments due to the consequences of the
“flagging out”4 of the fleet for tax revenue, employment,
the setting up of clusters and maritime expertise itself.
Faced with this loss of competitiveness of national
fleets and flagging out to more competitive flags, govern-
ments began (freely at the beginning and subsequently
under EU guidelines for state aid to maritime transport)
to set up a number of aids aimed at forestalling flagging
out, holding on to fleets and even attracting vessels cur-
rently sailing under foreign flags (mainly FOCs).
The 2009/2018 European maritime transport strategy,
presented by the EC in January 2009, aimed to make this
sector “more competitive and sustainable” and was based
on several foundations: sustainable development, eco-
nomic growth, the opening of markets in a context of
fair competition and high social and environmental stan-
dards ([4], p. 6). In fact, Valletta declaration on the EU’s
maritime policy outlines priorities for the EU’s maritime
transport policy, focusing on competitiveness, digitalisa-
tion and decarbonisation [8, 9].
According to Sdoukopoulos et al. [36] the main strategic
goals for the European maritime transport system may be
summarized to the following: 1. Develop and maintain an
attractive framework for quality shipping and quality of
operations in Europe; 2. Invest in human capital; 3. Pro-
mote greener maritime transport; 4. Give priority to the
enforcement of existing Community and International
rules that will lead to a safe and secure system; 5. Support
EU energy security; 6. Promote short sea connections be-
tween all maritime regions of the European continent, ad-
dressing the road congestion problems while reducing
significantly the environmental impact of the overall
transport chain; 7. Improve Europe’s commercial sea
ports; 8. Strengthen the competitiveness of the European
maritime industries and their capacity to meet the envir-
onmental, energy, safety and human challenges by sup-
porting research and innovation development.
Pallis [33] chronicles meticulously the stages by which
the European Community (later the EU) has moved into
the maritime transport policy field.
3 Measures for promoting maritime transport
adopted in EU member states
Lloyd and AMRIE [25], p. 23 state that the justification
for state aid (and therefore the goals of its impact) is to
establish compensatory aid to promote the development
of European maritime industries in the context of dis-
torted international competition caused the competitive
advantage offered by flags of convenience (FOCs). About
71% deadweight tonnage of the world’s ships sails under
3In its Fifth report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to
maritime cabotage (2001–2010) European Commission [11] believes
that the Regulation is fit for its purpose and does not require revision.
But this report states: “It appears that abolishing barriers in access to
cabotage markets has not led to any significant increase in the number
of shipowners interested in providing cabotage services. This might be
linked to the inherent features of the cabotage market, which, with a
few exceptions of routes of very high commercial interest, consists in
rather small passenger traffics and limited cargo volumes.
Furthermore, the geographical position often does not give any
advantage to maritime services compared to land transport, for
instance by requiring specific technical features of the ships (e.g. ships
sailing in the northern Europe often need to have an ice
class).Moreover, it should be noted that some shipowning companies
ensure their presence on cabotage markets of other Member States by
acquiring the shares in national shipowning companies rather than by
physically deploying the cabotage services ([11], p. 10)”
4Zamora [43] defines flagging out as “the practice of exporting vessels
to other flags, but without losing financial control of their operations”.
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foreign flags ([7], p. 22). In other words the idea is to
tackle the trend towards flagging out the European fleet
and resorting to FOCs.
Indeed, according to data from the Spanish Ship-
owners’ Association (ANAVE) (drawn from several
years) between 1975 and 2012 the global fleet grew by
190%. Over the same period the five main open regis-
tries (Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Malta and Cyprus)
recorded spectacular growth of 436%. As a result, by
2012 45% of the global fleet was registered under flags of
this type. However, the biggest growth in open registries
took place between 1975 and 2000, with annual in-
creases averaging 24% as compared to 10% increases in
the size of the global fleet. The biggest exodus of vessels
took place between 1990 and 2000. This trend is illus-
trated in Fig. 1.
However, to assess the effectiveness of the public sec-
tor policies implemented in the sector it is necessary to
analyse the factors that influence flagging-out. According
to an empirical study by Bergantino and Marlow [5], the
most widely accepted reason for flagging out is a need to
reduce operating costs. These authors state that until re-
cently the need for a favourable fiscal environment was
considered in the relevant literature to be a substantial
factor in flag changes, but other factors may now be
more significant. In any event, the consequences of
flagging out can be assessed and the political response to
the resulting problem can be reviewed.
Yannopoulos [42], p.197 states that “The existence of
flags of convenience creates a distinct type of dualism in
the international maritime transport industry. The mar-
ket is split into two distinct segments (or sectors) oper-
ating under different labour costs and different
conditions for efficiency. The first sector, to be called
the established flag sector, comprises tonnage under
registries of the traditional maritime nations. The second
sector of this dual market, to be referred to as the flag of
convenience sector, consists of vessels operating under
open registry systems”.
As stated by Chen et al. [7], there has been significant
academic discussion of the reasons for, consequences of
and legal governance of flagging out. The open registers
or “flags of convenience” have primarily attempted to at-
tract owners through four kinds of incentives: lower
labour costs, reduced taxes, decreased safety and envir-
onmental regulation, and freedom from intervention by
state government [34]. Because of these advantages,
some scholars believe that the escalating adoption of
FOC or open registration will be a long-term trend.
However,“the practice of flagging out has also been criti-
cized by scholars, since they believe that the conse-
quences of FOCs include a negative impact on ship
Fig. 1 Trend in fleet capacity (in DWT) by groups of countries and the global total, 1980–2008. Source: Own elaboration based on data from
UNCTAD (several years)
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safety, the marine environment, and fair market compe-
tition” ([7], p. 23). In that sense Metaxas [28] was
already anticipating that the costs of FOC institution far
outweigh its benefits.
Luo, Fan and Li [26] consider that the high proportion
of foreign-flagged vessels in the global fleet has implica-
tions not only for national and international public sec-
tor maritime policies but also for business strategies in
the maritime industry. Traditional maritime nations are
concerned at the reductions in their national fleets, the
loss of tax revenue, the fall in employment in the mari-
time industry and adverse effects on national security.
3.1 Classification of maritime transport policies
Chief among the wide range of measures adopted by al-
most all Member States to improve the competitiveness
of their fleets are fiscal and labour-related measures. The
document Towards a New Maritime Strategy acknowl-
edged the competitive advantage enjoyed by FOCs: for
Community shipowners registering their vessels in an
open registry may be an important factor in ensuring
that they are internationally competitive, as it entails
savings in labour costs and taxation that may be close to
$1 million per year [15].
The measures implemented in an effort to relax the
burden on firms are essentially the following: reduction
of operating costs, introduction of second registers (as a
particular way to reduce those costs), changes in tax-
ation systems via the more favourable “tonnage tax” and
other measures such as aids for investment and
subsidies.
3.2 Reduction of operating costs compared to labour
costs
One of the main arguments used in the maritime com-
munity to explain the lack of competitiveness of the
European fleet and the consequent flagging out of its
vessels is the high wage cost of employing domestic
crews. Manning costs for a standard vessel in 2012
accounted for 18.5% of total costs [2]. Thanopoulou [37]
, p.368 states that although manning costs as a share of
total costs are invariably between 9% and 15%, the op-
tions available to governments to support the potential
competitiveness of their national fleets have been very
limited. The focus has invariably been on manning costs,
due to the tradition of governments regulating crew
sizes and wages.
Guidelines on state aid have taken reducing labour
costs as one of their main measures for putting the oper-
ating cost of EU national flags on a par with those of
FOCs. This should serve to increase the international
competitiveness of European fleets by transferring cost
savings to charters.
Within this section, four types of aid related to man-
ning costs are specified:
a) Tax regime for seafarers
The Commission permits a favourable tax regime for
seafarers, which should be based on tax exemptions de-
pending on time spent on board vessels outside Com-
munity territorial waters or on tax deductions per day
spent on such vessels [13]. With a view to protecting
Community jobs, in 2004 these exemptions were limited
to “Community seafarers”, defined as follows:
– Community/EEA citizens, in the case of seafarers
working on board vessels (including Ro-Ro ferries)
providing scheduled passenger services between
ports of the Community;
– all seafarers liable to taxation and/or social security
contributions in Member State, in all other cases.
b) Social security contributions
The Commission supports the idea of minimising so-
cial security contributions for Community seafarers [13].
In 2004 reductions in social welfare burdens were also
limited to “Community seafarers” sailing on board ves-
sels registered in Member States.
iii) Repatriation costs (crew relief)
Aid is also envisaged in paying the cost of repatriat-
ing Community seafarers on board vessels registered
in the Community, particularly from the high seas. In
1989 this aid was limited to 50% of the cost incurred,
but the revised wording from 1997 and 2004 sets no
individual upper limit to such aid but rather considers
a joint limit for all benefits received: such benefits
must not exceed the total amount in taxes and social
security contributions paid for maritime transport ac-
tivities and seafarers [13].
iv) Training costs
The Commission considers training to be essential,
asserting that there is a need for seafarers to adapt to
technological changes. One solution put forward by the
Commission itself in 1989 was to transfer the relevant
costs to state education and vocational training systems
[16]. Subsequent wordings admit that training plans may
include state aid provided that they are specific on-
board training programmes and that it is the state itself
which funds them [13].
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3.3 The creation of “second registers”
In the 1980s, faced with flagged tonnage slipping away
towards FOCs, numerous EU countries set up “second
registers” (international registers) in an attempt to com-
pete on an equal footing with actual FOCs. These sec-
ond registers flagged vessels under certain islands or
colonial territories such as the Canaries (Spain), Kergue-
len (France), Gibraltar (UK), Aruba (the Netherlands),
the Faroe Isles (Denmark) and Madeira (Portugal).
Table 1 shows the main second registers alongside the
main flags of convenience.
Adjusting the conditions of traditional registries to
match those of FOC registries entailed making changes
in both tax legislation (reducing or eliminating tax on
the profits of shipping companies, allowing accelerated
depreciation of vessels, reducing income tax rates and
social security contributions) and labour legislation (ad-
mitting the employment of crews of any nationality). For
this reason, the states involved decided that the best
option was to set up “second registers”. Most of these
registers have some or all the characteristics of an FOC
as defined in the 1970 Rochdale Inquiry on the shipping
sector drawn up by the [20], p.19).
Within the group of “second registers”, a distinction is
drawn between “offshore registries” and “special registries”:
 Offshore registries are located in overseas territories
or possessions, and include registries in the Channel
Islands, the Falkland Islands, the Isle of Man, the
Turks and Caicos Islands and Gibraltar set up by the
UK; in the Dutch Antilles set up by the Netherlands;
and in the Kerguelen Isles and the Wallis and
Futuna Isles set up by France.
 Special registries are located within the territory of
the state. They include, in order of establishment,
the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS,
1987), the Danish International Register (DIS, 1988),
the Portugal-Madeira register (1988) and the
Table 1 Countries that offered FOC and second register services in 2010
FOC Second Registers
Countries Countries Registers
Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Brasil Registro Especial Brasileiro (REB)
Barbados Belize China Hong Kong
Bermudas (UK)) Bolivia Macao
Myanmar Cambodia Denmark DIS
Islas Caimán Comoros Feroe Islands
Cyprus Equatorial Guinea Feroe Islands (FAS)
Second Register of France
(FIS)
International Maritime Register of Germany
(GIS)
France Kerguelen Islands (French Southern and Antarctic
Lands)
Georgia Gibraltar (UK) Wallis and Futuna Islands
Honduras Jamaica Germany GIS
Lebanon Liberia Italy Second Register
Malta Marshall Islands Netherlands Netherlands Antilles
Mauritius Mongolia New Zeland Cook Islands
Netherlands Antilles North Korea Norway NIS
Panama Sao Tomé and Príncipe Portugal Madeira (MAR)
Saint Vicent and the
Granadines
Sri Lanka Spain Canary Islands (REC)











Source: Own elaboration based on data from International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) [21]
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German International Register (GIS, 1988). Accord-
ing to the [20], p.20), this period of intensive cre-
ation of new registries was followed by a period of
calm in which only one more or set up: the Canary
Islands special registry in Spain (REC, 1992). How-
ever, a new upsurge in activity was observed from
1997 onwards, with the setting up of the Turkish
second register (1997), the Brazilian special registry
(1997) and the Italian second register (1998).
Unlike traditional registries, second registers may be
open (i.e. may admit the registration of vessels by com-
panies owned by non-nationals of the state in question)
or closed (i.e. restricted to companies owned by state na-
tionals). There are second registers for which only ves-
sels operating in the international market are eligible
(Germany’s ISR and France’s FIS), but Italy’s registro
internazionale, which initially only admitted vessels en-
gaged in international trade, subsequently broadened its
criteria to include those engaged in cabotage. The Span-
ish REC and the Danish DIS did likewise.
Admitting vessels engaged in cabotage means that
fleets not subject to international competition can enjoy
the incentives provided by second registers. It must also
be taken into account that the free provision of cabotage
services under Regulation 3577/92 does not open up this
type of trade to all nationalities; rather, it is limited to
Community vessels and therefore subject to differences
in competitiveness between EU country flags.
Some authors consider that the setting up of these
registries provided an effective alternative way of redu-
cing the flagging-out of national fleets: for example the
DIS has shown itself to be an effective alternative for
avoiding the downward trend in the Danish fleet ([22],
p.182).5 However, the unilateral adoption of these mea-
sures by certain states has led to a distortion in competi-
tion: for instance in the case of Belgium (which has no
offshore registry) crews must be 100% Belgian nationals,
while under the DIS only the ship’s master is required to
be a national.
3.4 Tonnage tax
The Community Guidelines on State Aid to Maritime
Transport (97/C 205/05) acknowledged that the differ-
ences in competitiveness between vessels registered in
the Community and outside it (especially under FOCs)
were attributable to tax costs – corporation tax and sea-
farers’ social welfare payments – given that capital costs
and the technologies available were practically the same
all over the world.
As a result the main system of aid to encourage regis-
tration under national flags in most EU countries has
been the introduction of a tonnage tax to replace generic
corporation tax. Tonnage tax means basing tax pay-
ments on the registered tonnage of vessels multiplied by
a fixed amount. According to Adriaansens [1] , p.9, there
are three different models of tonnage tax in Europe:
– the Dutch model, introduced in 1996 and
implemented by Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,
Sweden and the UK;
– the Norwegian model, dating from 1996, adopted by
Finland; and
– the Greek model, introduced in 1957 and
implemented by Cyprus and Malta.
This system is based on “flag neutrality”,6 i.e. it is ap-
plicable to foreign-owned vessels controlled by domestic
shipowners. These schemes do not therefore directly
promote European flagging: they are intended rather to
enhance the competitiveness of Community fleets in the
market and promote European control of fleets.
3.5 Other measures
Some states have opted for different ways of promoting
their fleets which can be classed generically as aids for
investment and operating costs. The main forms of such
aid are the following:
a) aid for investment to improve equipment on board
vessels registered under national flags, and for the
use of reliable, non-polluting vessels;
b) regional aids for investment awarded to Maritime
companies in less favoured regions;
c) aid for funding public service obligations: aid to
offset operating losses is incompatible with the
common market, but subsidies for public service
obligations can be authorised;
d) aid for restructuring (including privatisation): this
aid is not specific to this sector but rather is
permitted under Community guidelines on state aid
for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty
[12]; and
5It is true that the Danish maritime policy has been altered since then:
On 10 April 2007, the Danish Parliament adopted the tonnage tax
(N563/2001) and in 2006 the Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs
published an Action Plan incorporating a range of initiatives including
training, recruitment, standards and technical regulations, or specific
tax schemes. Nowadays, the Danish fleet is growing in leaps and
bounds: by April 2018, 703 ships fly the Danish flag (480 ten years
before) (Danske [10]). The annual figures for the number of seafarers
on board ships registered in the DIS for the year 2019 shows that 9847
persons were covered.
6Except in Italy, where vessels seeking to benefit from this tax system
must fly the national flag.
Bilbao-Ubillos et al. European Transport Research Review            (2021) 13:7 Page 7 of 15
e) expressly authorised state aid for short-sea shipping
under the second revision of state aid for the sector
[13].
As well as these aids, shipping firms are authorised
under “Fiscal treatment of ship owning companies” to
adopt special measures for the accelerated depreciation
of investments or tax exemption on profits obtained on
the sale of vessels in case of reinvestment.
3.6 Timing of the measures adopted
Table 2 shows the main measures adopted by EU
countries.
4 Effectiveness of maritime transport policies
adopted in the EU: relative competitiveness
indicator
State aid in the framework of Community maritime
transport policy is mainly concerned with the need for a
competitive European merchant fleet. It has been dem-
onstrated that the decline of the fleet sailing under EU
Member State flags as a result of its lack of competitive-
ness on a global scale was one of the main factors
underlying the development of Community maritime
policy.
When it comes to using changes in competitiveness as
a yardstick for assessing the effectiveness of maritime
transport policies, two methodological issues must be re-
solved: selecting the variable observed and the reference
indicator.
4.1 Selection of the variable observed: controlled fleet
versus national flag
The exceptional nature of Community links to the bene-
ficiaries of state aid introduces a new concept: the “con-
trolled fleet”. Unlike flagging, control of a fleet means
that its commercial and operational management is
centred in a particular country but the fleet itself may
sail under an open registry or a flag of convenience. Ac-
cording to the UNCTAD ([39], p.43), the “country of
ownership indicates where the true controlling interest
(i.e. parent company) of the fleet is located”.
Thus, the controlled fleet includes both the fleet sailing
under the flag of the country of reference (“national flag”)
and vessels sailing under other flags which are owned by
national companies (“foreign flag”). Theoretically, there
are therefore two possibilities when it comes to defining
the relevant variable for observation: the capacity of the
controlled fleet or that of the national flagged fleet.
The national flag is associated with one of the initial
objectives of Community maritime policy (encouraging
ships to register or re-register under the flags of Member
States), but the notion of the “controlled fleet” fits better
with the actual measures adopted by Member States in
the light of the revision of the framework of state aid,
aimed at holding onto maritime business and the conse-
quent economic independence. Given the current make-
up of the sector, we thus believe that the effectiveness of
aid should be measured on the basis of the trend in the
controlled fleet (sailing under national and foreign flags).
4.2 Reference indicator: the concept of competitiveness in
the field of maritime transport
Thanopoulou [37] asserts that it is not initially possible
to identify “competitiveness” with “profitability”, given
the highly cyclical nature of maritime transport. We
have therefore opted for the most widely used exposed
competitiveness indicator, i.e. potential market share,
observing the trend in the relative shares of the cargo
capacity of the controlled fleet (in DWT) for each coun-
try in a global context. In other words, an increase in
the competitiveness of the fleet controlled by a particular
country should entail an increase in its share of the total
world market.
4.3 Trend in the European fleet in terms of control and
the flagged fleet
According to data from Eurostat [18], p.94 the con-
trolled fleet (sailing under national and foreign flags) of
the EU-15 countries grew by 114% between 1995 and
2011, and that of the EU-27 by 106%. Growth in the
total global fleet over that period was 99%. However, the
growth recorded was not regular: between 1995 and
2008 growth in the fleets of the EU-15 (22%) and EU-27
(21%) exceeded the global average of 17%, but in 2010
and 2011 there was a substantial slowdown in the
growth of the European fleet measured both in terms of
the EU-15 (9%) and the EU-27 (8%), with both falling
below the global average of 12%.
Table 2 Timing of the adoption of maritime transport policies by EU Member States
Measure\Country Germany Belgium Denmark Spain France Greece Italy Netherlands U.K. Sweeden
Tonage tax 1999 2003 2002 2003 2004 2002 2005 1996 2000
Second register 2006 1998
Other measures 2004 2003 2006 1997 2007 1996/2008 2002
Source: Own elaboration
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The share of the world market accounted for by the
European fleet decreased between 1995 and 2012 from
25% to 21%, but that of the controlled fleet increased
(due to growth in foreign flagged vessels). In 1996 the
fleet controlled by the EU-15 accounted for 31% of the
global total and that controlled by the EU-27 for 33%; in
2011 the equivalent figures were 33% and 34%. However,
Table 3 and Fig. 2a-b show that the market shares of
both sets of countries peaked in 2008 and began to de-
crease thereafter.
The share of foreign flagged vessels in the European
controlled fleet increased during the reference period
Table 3 Trend in the share of the main EU maritime countries in the world fleet (national flag and controlled fleet in DWT), 1996–
2011 (in %)
Germany Belgium Denmark Spain France Greece Italy Netherlands U.K. Sweeden
NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF NF CF
1996 0,9 2,7 0,0 0,6 1,1 1,8 0,1 0,5 0,6 1,1 6,8 17,4 1,1 1,8 0,5 0,9 0,8 3,1 0,3 2,1
1997 1,1 3,1 0,0 0,6 1,0 1,7 0,1 0,5 0,6 1,1 6,1 17,6 1,0 1,7 0,4 0,8 1,1 3,1 0,3 2,7
1998 1,3 3,7 0,0 1,1 0,9 1,9 0,0 0,5 0,3 0,6 5,9 17,9 1,0 1,7 0,4 0,7 0,8 2,7 0,2 2,9
1999 1,0 4,0 0,0 1,0 1,0 2,2 0,0 0,5 0,3 0,7 5,6 18,2 1,2 1,9 0,5 0,8 1,0 2,6 0,2 2,1
2000 1,0 4,4 0,0 0,9 1,1 2,4 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,7 5,8 19,1 1,2 1,8 0,5 0,8 1,1 2,6 0,2 1,4
2001 0,9 5,0 0,0 1,0 1,1 2,2 0,0 0,5 0,4 0,8 6,0 19,2 1,1 1,7 0,5 0,9 1,1 2,5 0,2 1,1
2002 0,9 5,3 0,0 0,8 1,1 2,2 0,0 0,6 0,4 0,8 5,8 19,5 1,1 1,6 0,5 0,9 1,0 2,4 0,2 0,9
2003 0,9 6,3 0,2 0,8 1,1 2,1 0,0 0,6 0,3 0,6 6,5 20,3 1,1 1,6 0,5 0,9 1,2 2,5 0,2 0,8
2004 1,1 6,9 0,5 1,0 1,0 2,0 0,0 0,5 0,3 0,8 6,1 18,5 1,1 1,6 0,5 0,8 1,3 3,1 0,2 0,6
2005 1,4 7,9 0,7 1,3 1,0 2,2 0,1 0,5 0,2 0,5 5,2 18,0 1,1 1,6 0,5 1,0 1,0 2,3 0,2 0,7
2006 1,3 8,7 0,7 1,3 1,0 2,2 0,1 0,5 0,3 0,6 5,1 17,4 1,2 1,6 0,4 0,9 1,0 2,7 0,2 0,7
2007 1,4 9,1 0,6 1,3 1,0 2,5 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,6 5,4 16,8 0,5 1,7 0,5 1,0 n.a. 2,8 n.a. 0,7
2008 1,6 9,5 0,6 1,2 1,1 2,9 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,6 4,8 15,3 1,2 1,8 0,4 0,8 1,0 2,8 0,2 0,7
2009 1,5 8,9 0,5 1,1 1,1 2,8 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,6 5,0 16,0 1,3 1,9 0,4 0,8 0,8 2,2 0,1 0,6
2010 1,2 8,3 0,4 0,9 1,0 2,5 0,1 0,4 0,2 0,7 4,7 14,7 1,2 1,7 0,3 0,7 0,6 1,6 0,1 0,4
2011 1,1 8,3 0,4 1,0 0,9 2,6 n.a. n.a. 0,2 0,7 4,3 14,8 1,2 1,6 0,3 0,8 0,1 1,2 0,1 0,4
NF National flag, CF Controlled fleet, n.a. Not available
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD [38]
a b
Fig. 2 a Trend in the share of the main EU maritime countries in the world fleet (national flag), 1996–2011 (in %). Greece is not included. Source: Own
elaboration based on data from UNCTAD (several years). b Trend in the share of the main EU maritime countries in the world fleet (controlled fleet in
DWT), 1996–2011 (in %). Greece and Germany are not included. Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD (several years)
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from 60% to 69%, while the share of vessels sailing under
national flags fell from 40% to 31%.
5 Formulation & estimation of models
We propose two models to compare the relative effect-
iveness of the maritime policy measures implemented:
one for the full set of countries and measures and the
other specifically for each maritime nation (the idea be-
ing to estimate whether the significance of the measures
adopted is similar across all countries).
In formulating the general model the following vari-
ables were considered:
– The dependent variable should be the one selected
to measure the trend in relative competitiveness of
the fleet controlled by each country (Table 3).
– The following explanatory variables were identified:
on the one hand the main maritime policy measures
adopted (the effectiveness of which we seek to
assess) and on the other hand the critical variables
which, according to economic literature, conditions
the competitiveness of the European fleet (i.e. tax
burden and labour costs) (Tables 4 and 5, Figs. 3
and 4).
– The general model thus looks like this:
Yit = αi + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3D1it + β4D2it + uit i = 1, …,
10; t = 1, …, 16
where.
- Yit is the percentage share in the cargo capacity (in
DWT) of the fleet controlled by the 10 European Mari-
time nations “i” out of the global total for the 16 years “t”;
- αi shows the individual effect for each country;
Table 4 Tax burden in selected EU countries, 1996–2011 (in % of GDP)
Country Tax burden (in % of GDP)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Germany 35,6 35,2 35,5 36,2 36,2 35,0 34,4 34,6 33,9 33,9 34,5 34,7 35,4 36,1 35,0 35,7
Belgium 43,0 43,5 44,1 43,9 43,6 43,5 43,6 43,1 43,2 43,1 42,8 42,6 43,0 42,1 42,4 43,0
Denmark 46,7 46,7 47,3 47,9 46,9 45,9 45,4 45,6 46,4 48,0 46,4 46,4 44,9 45,2 45,3 45,4
Spain 31,0 32,0 32,4 33,3 33,4 33,0 33,4 33,3 34,3 35,3 36,1 36,5 32,3 29,8 29,9 31,3
France 43,0 43,3 43,1 43,9 43,1 42,7 42,1 42,0 42,2 42,8 43,1 42,4 42,2 41,3 41,6 42,9
Greece 34,1 28,8 30,6 31,1 33,2 32,0 32,5 31,0 30,0 31,2 30,3 31,2 31,0 30,8 32,0 33,5
Italy 40,2 41,7 40,0 40,9 40,6 40,3 39,7 40,1 39,3 39,1 40,6 41,7 41,6 42,1 41,8 41,9
Netherl. 38,3 38,3 36,3 37,2 36,8 35,7 35,2 34,6 34,8 36,1 36,4 36,1 36,5 35,4 36,2 35,9
R. Unido 31,7 32,3 33,8 34,5 34,7 34,7 33,3 32,9 33,4 33,8 34,4 34,1 34,0 32,3 32,8 33,6
Sweeden 47,4 48,3 48,4 48,8 49,0 46,8 45,2 45,5 45,6 46,6 46,0 45,0 44,0 44,1 43,2 42,5
Source: Own elaboration based on data from [30], p. 84–85)
Table 5 Unitary Labour Cost in selected EU countries, 1996–2011 (2010 = 100)
Country Unitary labour Cost
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Germany 94,3 93,4 93,7 94,6 95,2 95,0 95,6 96,6 96,2 95,8 93,5 92,7 95,0 101,5 100,0 100,5
Belgium n.a. n.a. n.a. 83,1 83,4 86,8 88,6 89,3 88,2 89,1 91,4 93,1 97,4 100,8 100,0 102,9
Denmark 71,4 71,9 74,3 75,5 76,0 79,0 82,0 83,7 83,6 85,2 86,8 91,1 96,0 100.9 100,0 104,0
Spain 69,6 71 72,3 73,7 75,5 77,8 80,1 82,5 84,9 87,8 90,7 94,5 100,1 101,6 100,0 99,1
France 80,7 80,7 80,4 80,8 82,0 83,7 85,9 87,8 88,4 90,2 91,9 93,2 95,8 99,1 100,0 100,9
Greece 57,4 62,2 66,2 68,2 69,4 70,5 76,9 79,3 80,8 85,7 85,2 86,8 91,4 97,6 100,0 99,7
Italy 73,2 75,1 73,8 75,0 74,7 77,1 80,2 84,1 85,9 88,2 89,9 91,9 95,1 100 100,0 100,5
Netherlands 76,1 76,8 77,9 79,5 82,1 84,1 87,9 89,8 89,8 89,8 90,4 92,8 96,0 101,4 100,0 101,0
R. Unido 67,0 69,1 71,5 73,7 75,9 78,8 79,4 81,1 83,8 85,1 88,6 91,6 93,3 98,0 100,0 99,5
Sweeden 80,7 82,1 78,8 79,9 83,4 87,3 88,3 89,2 88,4 89,1 89,0 92,8 97,3 102,9 100,0 102,6
n.a. Not available
Source: Own elaboration based on data from OECD [29]
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- X1it is the “tax burden” variable (in % of GDP) in
country “i” for year “t”;
- X2it is the “unit labour cost” variable (base year
2010) in country “i” for year “t”;
- D1it is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 as
from the year following “t” in which country “i” adopts
tonnage tax (the instrument generally used) as a promo-
tional measure;
- D2it is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 as
from the year following “t” in which country “i” adopts
other promotional policies (setting up a 2nd registry and
other ways of reducing operating costs or providing aid);
- uit is the error term.
 The following model was also drawn up for each of
the 10 countries:
Y t ¼ β0 þ β1X1t þ β2X2t þ β3D1t þ β4D2t þ ut
where.
-Yt, is the percentage share in the cargo capacity (in
DWT) of the fleet controlled by the country out of the
global total for year “t”;
- β0 is the independent term;
- X1t is the “tax burden” variable (in % of GDP) for
the country for year “t”;
- X2t is the “unit labour cost” variable (base year 2010)
for the country for year “t”;
- D1t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 as
from the year following “t” in which the country in ques-
tion” adopts tonnage tax as a promotional measure;
- D2t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 as
from the year following “t” in which the country in ques-
tion” adopts other promotional policies;
-ut is the error term.
5.1 Estimates and results
 The estimation results for the general model in
which the dependent variable is the share of the
fleet controlled by each country in the global total
are shown in Table 6. A fixed effects model is
estimated, because apart from the fact that we are
seeking to estimate the country effect we also use
the Hausman test to gauge which estimator is best
suited to the model proposed.7 Moreover, the high
R-squared LSDV (0.972598) confirms that the model
is properly specified.
Most of the variables considered are statistically sig-
nificant and have the signs expected. The introduction
of these measures (tonnage tax/second register and
Fig. 3 Tax burden in selected EU countries, 1996–2011 (in % of GDP). Source: Own elaboration based on data from [29], p. 84–85)
7The result of the test leads us to estimate a fixed effect model.
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other measures) has apparently been effective and has
had a positive effect on the trend in the controlled fleet
(they have direct, significant links with it). Tonnage tax
seems to have had the greatest impact the judge from
the fact that it has the highest coefficient. As for the
context variables which are theoretically relevant, only
unit labour costs seem to have had any negative condi-
tioning effect on the trend in the controlled fleet (the co-
efficient of − 8.06 is striking); the tax burden does not
seem to be significant in explaining the dependent
variable.
 The results of the OLS estimation for each of the 10
countries are outlined in Table 7. Tonnage tax is
shown to be significant only in the trends in the
fleets of Germany and Belgium. The other measures
introduced (including second registers) are
significant for Germany, Greece, the Netherlands
and Sweden, though only in the case of Germany do
they show the positive sign expected (direct link
with competitiveness). The context variables are
significant only in certain countries: unit labour
costs in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK and
the tax burden only in Italy.
6 Conclusions
1. In spite of the Community guidelines on state aid to
maritime transport, the degree to which the schemes set
up are used seems to mean that some European regis-
tries are more competitive than others (there are also
differences in the requirements concerning the propor-
tion of foreign nationals in crews and in manning levels,
which are determinant factors in the operating costs of
vessels). This distorts competition within the EU. Thus,
according to data from the UNCTAD [40], in 2011:
– In Germany there were 438 ships registered under
other European registries compared to 422 sailing
under the German flag. In terms of capacity the
tonnage flagged in Germany (17.3 million DWT)
Fig. 4 Unitary Labour Cost in selected EU countries, 1996–2011 (2010 = 100). Source: Own elaboration based on data from OECD [29]
Table 6 Regression estimates of impact of maritime transport






Second register and other measures 0,683,649***
(0,22)
Labour Unitary Cost − 806295***
(1,32)
Tax burden − 366,734
(6,26)
R2 MCVF (LSDV) 0,972,598
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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exceeded the tonnage sailing under other European
flags (10.2 million DWT).
– In France the capacity of the fleet controlled by
French shipowners but sailing under other European
registries totalled 4.24 million DWT, which means it
exceeded that of the fleet sailing under the French
flag (3.43 million DWT).
– Increase there were 692 vessels flagged under other
European registries, with a total capacity of 44.55
million DWT, compared to 738 vessels with a
capacity of 64.92 million DWT sailing under the
Greek flag.
– In the UK vessels sailing under other European flags
accounted for a capacity of 1.68 million DWT
compared to 2.09 million DWT for vessels flagged in
the UK.
– In Sweden vessels sailing under other European flags
accounted for 1.66 million DWT, and thus exceeded
the 1.07 million DWT in capacity registered under
the Swedish flag.
2. In general the measures adopted in national-level
maritime policies (tonnage tax, second register and
other measures) seem to have been effective in that
they have had a positive effect on the competitive-
ness of controlled fleets. Relatively speaking, tonnage
tax seems to have had the greatest impact. As for
the context variables which are theoretically rele-
vant, unit labour costs seem to have had a negative
conditioning effect on the trend in the controlled
fleet, but the tax burden does not. This result con-
firms some earlier studies conducted in the UK [23]
and in the EU (positive correlations were found be-
tween the different regimes of state aid and increases
in the size of fleets and the number of jobs for sea-
farers between 1997 and 2004, according to Lloyd
and AMRIE [25]).
3. The impact of these measures on the controlled
fleets by UE countries has not been consistent: in
some cases, such as Germany, they have had a clear,
direct, strong effect while in others, such as the
Netherlands and Greece, they have completely failed
to reverse the trend towards lower competitiveness
of national fleets.
4. State aid seems to be effective in the early years of
its application, even in terms of national flags. Once
the competitive edge disappears an increase in the
proportion of foreign flagged vessels in fleets is
observed. Marlow and Mitroussi [27] also found that
the perceived benefit of tonnage tax is greater in the
first few years after its introduction. The overall
increase in foreign flagged vessels in the European
controlled fleet (from 58% in 1996 to 69% in 2011)
is a sign that EU national flags were not competitive
on the international market in spite of the
introduction of aid. However, country effects are
also highly significant here: there are countries in
which the share of foreign flagged vessels increased
in the years following the introduction of incentives
(from 66% to 86% in Germany, from 43% to 66% in
Denmark, from 47% to 69% in France and from 38%
to 63% in the Netherlands) and others in which it
decreased (from 97% to 54% in Belgium due to the
transfer of the Luxembourg flagged fleet to its own
national registry, from 81% to 70% in Spain, from
43% to 28% in Italy, from 62% to 60% in the UK and
from 85% to 79% in Sweden).
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